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ABSTRACT—Can the Supreme Court find unconstitutional something that 
the text of the Constitution “contemplates”? If the Bill of Rights mentions a 
punishment, does that make it a “permissible legislative choice” immune to 
independent constitutional challenges? 
Recent developments have given new hope to those seeking 
constitutional abolition of the death penalty. But some supporters of the 
death penalty continue to argue, as they have since Furman v. Georgia, that 
the death penalty must be constitutional because the Fifth Amendment 
explicitly contemplates it. The appeal of this argument is obvious, but its 
strength is largely superficial, and is also mostly irrelevant to the claims 
being made against the constitutionality of capital punishment. At most, the 
references to the death penalty in the Fifth Amendment may reflect a 
Founding Era assumption that it was constitutionally permissible at that 
time. But they do not amount to a constitutional authorization; if capital 
punishment violates another constitutional provision, it is unconstitutional. 
And once that point is conceded, the Fifth Amendment Argument does 
very little work. There might be good arguments for the constitutionality of 
the death penalty, but the Fifth Amendment is not among them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Can the Supreme Court find unconstitutional something that the text 
of the Constitution “contemplates”?1 If the Bill of Rights mentions a 
punishment, does that make it a “permissible legislative choice” immune to 
independent constitutional challenges?2 
The dueling opinions in Glossip v. Gross3 have brought renewed 
attention to the constitutionality of the death penalty.4 In a dissent joined by 
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer identified “three fundamental 
constitutional defects” with the death penalty: “(1) serious unreliability, (2) 
arbitrariness in application, and (3) unconscionably long delays.”5 These 
defects led him to conclude “that the death penalty, in and of itself, now 
likely constitutes a legally prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t].’”6 
Justice Breyer’s dissent marked the first time .1 that two members of the 
current Court have announced a belief that the death penalty is likely 
 
1 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis removed). 
2 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 87–88 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
3 135 S. Ct. 2726. 
4 See generally E.B., Capital Punishment and the Supreme Court: Last Gasps, THE ECONOMIST: 
DEMOCRACY IN AM. (June 29, 2015, 10:51 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/ 
democracyinamerica/2015/06/capital-punishment-and-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/C6R4-MKCK] 
(analyzing the competing opinions in Glossip); Linda Greenhouse, Editorial, Talking About the Death 
Penalty, Court to Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/08/20/opinion/talking-about-the-death-penalty-court-tocourt.html?smid=pl-share [https://perma. 
cc/Y8AM-EHZP] (arguing Glossip and state court cases signal that the Supreme Court will eventually 
find the death penalty unconstitutional); Richard Wolf & Kevin Johnson, Courts, States Put Death 
Penalty on Life Support, USA TODAY (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2015/09/14/death-penalty-execution-supreme-court-lethal-injection/32425015/ 
[http://perma.cc/KF2P-E8CJ] (“The ruling gave impetus to states . . . seeking to jump-start executions 
after a hiatus of several years. But it also rejuvenated legal efforts by groups opposed to the death 
penalty . . . .”). 
5 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
6 Id. at 2756 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII). 
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unconstitutional “in and of itself,” and the opinion has justifiably been 
treated as a significant development.7 
In a blistering concurrence, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) 
wrote that the dissent was full of “gobbledy-gook,” and that “not once in 
the history of the American Republic has this Court ever suggested the 
death penalty is categorically impermissible.”8 Justice Scalia argued that 
the Fifth Amendment afforded a textual basis for the capital punishment’s 
continued constitutionality: 
The reason is obvious: It is impossible to hold unconstitutional that which the 
Constitution explicitly contemplates. The Fifth Amendment provides that 
“[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital . . . crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,” and that no person shall be 
“deprived of life . . . without due process of law.”9 
Announcing his concurrence from the bench, Justice Scalia made the 
point even more strongly, saying that “the death penalty is approved by the 
Constitution.”10 He and many others have made some version of this 
point—the “Fifth Amendment Argument,” for simplicity’s sake11—many 
times before.12 Perhaps the Argument is best understood as a simple 
rhetorical move, or a suggestion that the death penalty is constitutional “in 
principle” so long as it does not run afoul of other constitutional 
prohibitions. Though it might render the Argument more persuasive, this 
narrow reading does not account for the way proponents actually use it—as 
a response to other constitutional arguments—nor the respect it garners: 
 
7 See supra note 4. 
8 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2747 (Scalia, J., concurring). A few months later, Justice Scalia said he 
“wouldn’t be surprised” if the Court were to find the death penalty unconstitutional. Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Scalia Says He ‘Wouldn’t Be Surprised’ if SCOTUS Overturns the Death Penalty, A.B.A. J. 
(Sept. 24, 2015, 7:16 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_says_ 
he_wouldnt_be_surprised_if_scotus_overturns_the_death_penalty/ [https://perma.cc/J5V2-5UR6]. 
9 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2747 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
10 For an audio recording and transcript of the opinion announcement, see Glossip v. Gross: 
Announcement–June 29, 2015 (Part 4), OYEZ PROJECT, https://apps.oyez.org/ 
player/#/roberts6/opinion_announcement_audio/23934 [https://perma.cc/9MG5-PAD7]. (last visited 
July 3, 2016) (“[U]nlike opposite sex marriage, the death penalty is approved by the Constitution. You 
are all familiar with the provision. No person shall be ‘deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process.’ Another provision requires a grand jury indictment for all capital crimes; that is all crimes 
involving the death penalty. Nonetheless, these two Justices now propose to take the issue of capital 
punishment entirely away from the people on the basis of nothing but their own policy preferences.”).  
11 Substantially the same arguments can be made regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
provides: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. But since the Fifth Amendment is more commonly invoked—
perhaps because of its proximity in time and text to the Eighth—it is the more natural referent here. 
12 See infra Part I. 
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Even critics of capital punishment have described it as a “devastating 
problem.”13 
It is nothing of the sort. The Fifth Amendment contains prohibitions, 
not powers,14 and there is no reason to suppose that it somehow nullifies 
other constitutional prohibitions—most importantly, the ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment.15 The real target of the Fifth Amendment Argument 
can only be the Court’s longstanding Eighth Amendment doctrine, which is 
not limited to the punishments considered cruel and unusual at the time of 
the Constitution’s framing.16 Unless and until that doctrine changes, the 
Argument itself carries no weight.17 
To be clear, the inverse argument would be equally faulty. The 
weakness of the Fifth Amendment Argument does not mean that the death 
penalty is unconstitutional, let alone “categorically” so, only that the 
“constitutional defects” Justice Breyer identifies cannot be dismissed out of 
hand. Glossip, along with other developments in law and practice,18 have 
made the continuing constitutionality of capital punishment a pressing 
question. That question should be answered without the distraction of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
 
13 Sanford Levinson, Wrong But Legal?, NATION, Feb. 26, 1983, at 248 (“Any textualist comes up 
with a devastating problem in regard to the death penalty: both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
specifically acknowledge the possibility of a death penalty. They require only that due process of law be 
followed before a person can be deprived of life.”). 
14 See infra Section II.A. 
15 See infra Section II.B. 
16 See infra Section II.C. 
17 Notably, some state courts have directly confronted the issue and held the death penalty to be 
cruel and unusual punishment despite references to capital punishment in their state constitutions. See, 
e.g., People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 886 (Cal. 1972) (“We perceive no possible conflict or 
repugnance between those provisions and the cruel or unusual punishment clause . . . , for none of the 
incidental references to the death penalty purport to give its existence constitutional stature. They do no 
more than recognize its existence at the time of their adoption.”), superseded by CAL. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 27 (explaining that the death penalty will not be deemed “cruel or unusual punishment[]”); State v. 
Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 80 (Conn. 2015) (“[I]ncidental references to the death penalty in a state 
constitution merely acknowledge that the penalty was in use at the time of drafting; they do not forever 
enshrine the death penalty’s constitutional status as standards of decency continue to evolve . . . .”).  
18 See, e.g., Editorial, The Slow Demise of Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2013, at A18 
(“Public support for the death penalty—an important factor in the Supreme Court’s consideration of its 
constitutionality—is at its lowest level in four decades, and 40 percent of people surveyed by Gallup 
say they do not believe it is administered fairly.”); see also James Gibson & Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Death Penalty Drugs and the International Moral Marketplace, 103 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1217 (2015) 
(explaining the impact of European drug manufacturers’ refusal to export lethal injection drugs). 
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I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT 
Although it comes in slightly different variations, the basic thrust of 
the Fifth Amendment Argument is that the text of the Amendment insulates 
the death penalty against constitutional challenge. 
In its strongest form, the Argument holds that capital punishment must 
be constitutionally permissible because the text of the Fifth Amendment 
refers to it. Justice Scalia made this argument in Glossip: “It is impossible 
to hold unconstitutional that which the Constitution explicitly 
contemplates,”19 as well as in Baze v. Rees, where he wrote that “the very 
text of the document recognizes that the death penalty is a permissible 
legislative choice.”20 Chief Justice Burger took the same tack in Furman v. 
Georgia, arguing that “the explicit language of the Constitution 
affirmatively acknowledges the legal power to impose capital 
punishment.”21 
A slightly different form of the Argument makes the more modest 
claim that the text of the Fifth Amendment shows that the Framers 
believed that the death penalty was constitutional. As the joint opinion in 
Gregg v. Georgia put it, “[i]t is apparent from the text of the Constitution 
itself that the existence of capital punishment was accepted by the 
Framers.”22 Other Justices have echoed this view,23 and as a matter of 
historical fact it is incontestable that the Framers believed the death penalty 
could constitutionally be administered at that time. Depending on one’s 
version of originalism, the Framers-thought-it-constitutional argument 
could be more or less identical to the Constitution-says-it-now argument, 
 
19 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
20 553 U.S. 35, 87 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The United States had argued as 
much in its brief. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10–11, 
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (No. 07-5439), 2007 WL 4351595, at *10–11 (“The starting point for 
any analysis of petitioners’ Eighth Amendment claim is that capital punishment is itself constitutional. 
It is constitutional not only in the sense that the Court’s cases have upheld the death penalty, . . . but 
also in the sense that the Constitution expressly contemplates capital punishment. The Fifth 
Amendment ‘contemplate[s] the continued existence of the capital sanction by imposing certain limits 
on the prosecution of capital cases.’”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)). 
21 408 U.S. 238, 380 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also William W. Berry III, Repudiating 
Death, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 441, 450 (2011) (“These constitutional provisions plainly 
allow for the possibility that federal and state governments may choose to use capital punishment . . . .” 
(citing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments)). 
22 428 U.S. at 177 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.). 
23 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 350–51 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (“It is plain enough 
that the Constitution drafted by the Framers expressly made room for the death penalty. The Fifth 
Amendment provides . . . .”). 
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but in practice most originalists do not think that original expected 
applications translate directly into constitutional doctrine.24 
Whatever its precise form, the Fifth Amendment Argument seems to 
have a broad and deep influence. Not only is it deployed as a rejoinder to 
abolition, it also serves as the fulcrum for other pro-death penalty 
arguments. Perhaps most importantly, it appears uncredited in cases 
(including Glossip itself) involving Eighth Amendment challenges to 
methods of execution. Rejecting one such challenge in Baze v. Rees, Chief 
Justice Roberts framed the case—and thereby effectively decided it—as 
follows: “We begin with the principle . . . that capital punishment is 
constitutional. It necessarily follows that there must be a means of carrying 
it out.”25 
Chief Justice Roberts’s argument in Baze has become a standby 
response to methods-of-execution challenges.26 It is problematic for many 
reasons,27 not least of which is the way in which it decontextualizes the 
inquiry—as if there were such a thing as “capital punishment” separate 
from the means of carrying it out. (Similarly, one could grant Justice 
Scalia’s argument that the death penalty is not “categorically 
impermissible” while maintaining that the conditions of its use do not 
currently satisfy the Eighth Amendment, and perhaps never will.) One 
supposes that if the death penalty were uniformly practiced by lowering 
people into molten lead, or if the only drugs available for lethal injection 
caused torturous pain, the Court would (quite properly) take note of that 
context. It simply does not follow—let alone “necessarily”—that a 
constitutional “means” currently exists to carry out every constitutional 
end. 
For present purposes, however, the primary puzzle is where the Baze 
Court gets its major premise: the “principle . . . that capital punishment is 
constitutional.”28 Baze says that this was “settled by Gregg,”29 but that is 
unsatisfying. It is true that Gregg upheld the constitutionality of the death 
 
24 See infra notes 69–76 and accompanying text. 
25 Baze, 553 U.S. at 47 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 
26 See, e.g., id. at 63 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[W]e proceed on the assumption that the death penalty 
is constitutional.”); see also Berry, supra note 21, at 450 (“These constitutional provisions plainly allow 
for the possibility that federal and state governments may choose to use capital punishment . . . .”). 
27 See generally Nadia N. Sawicki, “There Must Be a Means”—The Backward Jurisprudence of 
Baze v. Rees, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1407 (2010) (discussing the flaws in the Baze plurality opinion’s 
reasoning and the consequences of that reasoning); Phyllis Goldfarb, Response, Glossip v. Gross, GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (July 2, 2015), http://www.gwlr.org/glossip-v-gross/ [https://perma.cc/AUU2-
6754] (“An adverse impact on the quality of the Court’s functioning is yet more collateral damage from 
our capital punishment system.”). 
28 Baze, 553 U.S. at 47 (plurality opinion). 
29 Id. 
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penalty and remains the law of the land. But no one (presumably including 
the Baze majority) would interpret Gregg as pre-settling all future 
constitutional challenges to the death penalty. Gregg did not even involve a 
challenge to methods of execution,30 and it hardly seems sufficient to reject 
a constitutional challenge by invoking a case that did not reach that issue. 
Notably, Justice Stevens joined the joint opinion in Gregg (including that 
portion citing the Fifth Amendment), but concurred with some important 
reservations in Baze. As he explained in the latter opinion: “[T]he 
guarantees of procedural fairness contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not resolve the substantive questions relating to the 
separate limitations imposed by the Eighth Amendment.”31 
The underlying supposition behind the “principle” cited in Baze seems 
to be some version of the Fifth Amendment Argument. Indeed, the joint 
opinion in Gregg itself appears to rest there: 
It is apparent from the text of the Constitution itself that the existence of 
capital punishment was accepted by the Framers. . . . The Fifth Amendment, 
adopted at the same time as the Eighth, contemplated the continued existence 
of the capital sanction by imposing certain limits on the prosecution of capital 
cases . . . .32 
As a statement about the original expected application of the Fifth and 
Eighth Amendments, this is right as far as it goes. The Fifth Amendment 
Argument, however, attempts to translate that historical observation into 
something like a categorical protection for the contemporary death penalty. 
Gregg’s use of the Fifth Amendment Argument is significant not only 
for what it says about the constitutionality of capital punishment, but also 
for its role as a lodestar in debates about constitutional interpretation. As a 
matter of interpretive methodology, the Fifth Amendment Argument has 
had particular appeal to originalists and textualists, and has sometimes been 
trumpeted as demonstrating the power of those methods to deliver clear 
constitutional results. It is thus used not only as an argument against 
abolition of the death penalty, but for originalism. 
In Originalism: The Lesser Evil, Justice Scalia pointed to the Fifth 
Amendment Argument as his first example for the point that, to an 
originalist, “for the vast majority of questions the answer is clear.”33 As 
 
30 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) 
(considering “whether the sentence of death for the crime of murder is a per se violation of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution”). 
31 Baze, 553 U.S. at 86 n.19 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
32 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.). 
33 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989). 
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Justice Powell said in Furman, “there cannot be the slightest doubt that [the 
Framers of the Constitution] intended no absolute bar on the Government’s 
authority to impose the death penalty.”34 And, as Justice Powell did, those 
who invoke the Fifth Amendment Argument often note simultaneously that 
the same Congress that proposed the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
“cruel and unusual punishments” also passed legislation making several 
offenses punishable by death.35 
The Argument’s role in the interpretive debates is a testament to its 
influence. Even those who are skeptical of the death penalty have 
sometimes conceded the power of the Argument. Justice Blackmun himself 
wrote, seemingly in reference to the Fifth Amendment, that “the 
Constitution appears to permit[] the penalty of death.”36 Scholars, including 
those critical of the death penalty, have sometimes made the same 
concession.37 
And yet there are also those who question the Argument. In the same 
opinion in which he noted that “the Constitution appears to permit[] the 
penalty of death,”38 Justice Blackmun also penned his famous declaration: 
“From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of 
death.”39 How can these statements be reconciled? How could he refuse to 
engage with a machinery that the Constitution “appears to permit”? Justice 
Blackmun himself provided an answer: “Although most of the public 
seems to desire, and the Constitution appears to permit, the penalty of 
death, it surely is beyond dispute that if the death penalty cannot be 
administered consistently and rationally, it may not be administered at 
all.”40 Justice Blackmun’s conclusion might well be correct even if, as he 
suggests, there is public and textual support for the death penalty. But his 
conclusion is almost beyond dispute if the phrase “and the Constitution 
 
34 408 U.S. 238, 419 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
35 Id. at 420 (referring to the first Crimes Act of 1790); see also Baze, 553 U.S. at 88 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
36 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1147 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
37 Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2007) (“[N]either the 
text nor the original understanding of the Constitution supported Furman’s ruling. . . . The 
Constitution’s text clearly assumes the death penalty’s legitimacy, and the Framers did as well.”); 
Levinson, supra note 13; cf. John Hart Ely, Interclausal Immunity, 87 VA. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2001) 
(“Since 1964 [the Supreme Court] has been going back and forth, invariably with dissents, on the 
question whether capital punishment should be held to violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause, despite the fact that the Fifth Amendment, ratified at the same time, 
appears explicitly to assume the existence of the death penalty no fewer than three times.”). 
38 Callins, 510 U.S. at 1147 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
39 Id. at 1145 (emphasis added). 
40 Id. at 1147. 
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appears to permit”41 has no weight—public support alone cannot 
constitutionalize the death penalty if it cannot be applied consistently and 
rationally. In other words, Justice Blackmun might be right even if the Fifth 
Amendment Argument is correct.42 He is almost certainly right if it is not. 
II. THE FLAWS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT 
Despite its prevalence, longevity, and apparent influence, the Fifth 
Amendment Argument is deeply flawed. The relevant text of the Fifth 
Amendment contains prohibitions on the use of capital punishment, not a 
grant of government power.43 And even if the Fifth Amendment provided a 
grant of government power, the Eighth Amendment’s limitations would 
still apply.44 For the Argument to have any real power, the Court would 
first have to overturn decades of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. But the 
Fifth Amendment Argument has no purchase on Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence and therefore provides no guidance with regard to the 
continued constitutionality of the capital sanction. 
A. The Fifth Amendment Contains Prohibitions, Not Powers 
The text of the Fifth Amendment contains three prohibitions on the 
use of capital punishment: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, . . . nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .45 
The Fifth Amendment Argument, however, is not used in cases 
involving these three rights—to a grand jury, to due process, and against 
double jeopardy. As noted above, it is instead used as a rejoinder to other 
constitutional arguments, most notably those derived from the Eighth 
Amendment. 
 
41 Public support—or lack thereof—for a penalty is a factor in Eighth Amendment analysis, but it is 
not dispositive. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002) (“The consensus reflected in [public] 
deliberations informs our answer to the question presented by this case: whether such executions are 
‘cruel and unusual punishments’ prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.”). 
42 As noted below, even if the Fifth Amendment is read as a textual approval of the death penalty, it 
might still be trumped by other constitutional guarantees. 
43 See infra Section II.A. 
44 See infra Section II.B. 
45 U.S. CONST. amend V. 
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In other words, the Fifth Amendment Argument takes a list of rights 
against government to be evidence of a government power and then 
insulates that power against other constitutional provisions. This version of 
the Fifth Amendment Argument is exactly the nightmare of those 
Federalists who worried that a Bill of Rights might be misinterpreted to 
give government the power to do things not expressly forbidden.46 Part of 
their solution—the Ninth Amendment—is discussed in more detail below.47 
To this textual argument, the most obvious rejoinder is what Justice 
Brennan called the “narrow textual response”: The “amendment does not, 
after all, declare that the right of the Congress to punish capitally shall be 
inviolable; it merely requires that when and if death is a possible 
punishment, the defendant shall enjoy certain procedural safeguards, such 
as indictment by a grand jury and, of course, due process.”48 The reason for 
including those prohibitions—or any prohibition—is the fear of a potential 
wrong. And in that sense, the Fifth Amendment “contemplates” the death 
penalty as a possible punishment,49 but only insomuch as it seeks to limit 
that possibility.50 
The Fifth Amendment Argument instead transforms the textual 
prohibitions (i.e., “If not Y then not X”) into conditional grants of power 
(i.e., “If Y then X”). This requires a logical leap, since none of the three 
relevant passages in the Amendment can legitimately be rephrased as such: 
(1) “No person shall . . . unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury . . .” à No X (death penalty) unless Y (presentment or indictment) à If 
no Y then no X. 
If no Y then no X ≠ If Y then X. 
 
46 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 433–34 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“[B]ills 
of rights . . . are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They 
would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a 
colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which 
there is no power to do? . . . [I]t would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for 
claiming . . . power.”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 328 
(2005) (“In 1787 and 1788, Federalists had repeatedly warned that a bill of rights, if incautiously 
drafted, might actually weaken certain protections in the original Constitution by unintentionally 
expanding federal powers and restricting implicit rights.”). 
47 See infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
48 William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the 
Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 324 (1986). 
49 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis removed). 
50 Bruce Ledewitz, Judicial Conscience and Natural Rights: A Reply to Professor Jaffa, 10 U. 
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 449, 459 (1987) (“The fifth amendment represents a limitation on capital 
punishment, that it was not to be carried out in the future as it had been in the past. One could hardly 
call the due process clause an endorsement of capital punishment. It acknowledges that capital 
punishment was a prevailing practice, but this recognition is similar to the recognition accorded 
slavery.”). 
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(2) “nor shall . . . twice put in jeopardy” à No X (death penalty) if Y (double 
jeopardy) à If Y then no X. 
If Y then no X ≠ If no Y then X. 
(3) “nor be deprived . . . without due process” à No X (death penalty) without 
Y (due process) à If no Y then no X. 
If no Y then no X ≠ If Y then X. 
As a straightforward matter of logic, then, it is wrong to say that the 
text of the Fifth Amendment establishes the constitutionality of the death 
penalty. 
But perhaps the logic-chain answer to the Fifth Amendment Argument 
commits the very same sin inherent in the Argument: oversimplifying the 
text and thereby distorting its meaning. After all, the three supposed 
prohibitions all contain language that might be read as conditional—
especially “unless,” but also “without,” and even “twice,” which could 
arguably be read to imply that it is permissible to be “put in jeopardy of life 
or limb,” but only once. Perhaps those should be read as the only 
conditions to capital punishment’s use, or—what basically comes to the 
same thing—an exclusive list of rules against it. 
As a matter of linguistic use, it is true that prohibitions can sometimes 
be read as conditional approvals. If I tell my son, “No dessert unless you 
eat your vegetables,” he might reasonably understand me to be saying that 
he can get dessert if he proves that he’s eaten his vegetables. 
But not all prohibitions are implied approvals, nor are all conditions 
implied to be exclusive. If I tell my son, “Don’t pull the cat’s tail,” I have 
not thereby given him permission to pull its ears and whiskers. If my 
syllabus says, “No person shall receive an A in this course without 
participating regularly in class,” then it should be clear that regular class 
participation is necessary but not sufficient for an A. 
What if a student disputed my reading of the syllabus, and said that 
her regular participation in class entitles her to an A? As in any other such 
case, the supposed ambiguity would be resolved by reference to context 
and background—it is simply unreasonable to assume that class 
participation is the sole condition for earning an A. Nor does that 
conclusion change if the syllabus, like the Fifth Amendment, contains three 
supposed preconditions: class attendance, timely completion of 
assignments, and respect for other students. The obvious reason for 
including those rules—whether in a syllabus or a Bill of Rights—is that 
they refer to actions that are especially important to encourage or prohibit. 
The text of the Fifth Amendment, then, should draw our attention to 
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particular problems (double jeopardy and denial of due process, for 
example), not blind us to the possibility of others. 
The student would be on stronger ground if she insisted that the 
syllabus tacitly promises that an A is possible “in principle,” so long as the 
listed conditions are satisfied along with whatever other conditions (a 
strong exam, for example) are required. Likewise, the Fifth Amendment 
Argument is most defensible when it is used to suggest that the death 
penalty is constitutional in the abstract. But the same thing that makes it 
defensible—dissociation from reality—also renders it ineffective against 
the kinds of arguments raised by Justice Breyer in Glossip.51 The only way 
for the Argument to answer those criticisms is to treat the constitutional 
text as giving the government something like a death penalty power. 
But, of course, there are especially good reasons not to infer 
governmental powers from the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights,52 whose 
very function is to limit governmental power. Put another way, compliance 
with one prohibition in the Bill of Rights is not a sufficient basis for 
government to do the thing that the right would otherwise have prohibited. 
If the government has a power—or, as the Fifth Amendment Argument 
suggests, something like a right53—to execute its citizens, it must derive 
from somewhere other than the Fifth Amendment. 
B. The Fifth Amendment Argument’s Prohibitions Are Not Exclusive 
The Fifth Amendment Argument is typically used to shut down other 
constitutional claims, especially those derived from the Eighth 
Amendment. This it cannot do. As explained in more detail in the 
following Section, it is also a poor vehicle for interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment, especially given longstanding doctrine. 
The most obvious reason why the Fifth Amendment Argument cannot 
trump the Eighth is that their prohibitions are cumulative.54 Complying with 
 
51 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to practical problems with 
“administration of the death penalty” such as “(1) serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application, 
and (3) unconscionably long delays”). 
52 See infra Section II.C. 
53 See Sherry F. Colb, A Fundamental Right to Execute People, DORF ON LAW (Aug. 5, 2015, 8:30 
AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2015/08/a-fundamental-right-to-execute-people.html [https://perma.cc/ 
89FF-DXSE] (arguing Glossip relies on an indefensible Fifth Amendment-based “‘right’ of the state to 
execute . . . prisoner[s]”). 
54 The symmetry with the previous Section of the Essay may be apparent, and logically speaking 
the two Sections are almost identical: Generally, saying that X is an exclusive list of prohibitions is the 
same as saying that complying with those prohibitions means one is entitled to act. Here, the matter is 
slightly complicated by the fact that the federal government, at least, has no default power to act, 
whether with regard to capital punishment or anything else—it can only do so pursuant to an 
enumerated power. Whether or not one considers the enumerated power rule to be a prohibition, 
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one set of prohibitions does not give the government license to violate 
another, any more than—according to another list of ten prohibitions—
declining to bear false witness against one’s neighbors gives license to 
covet their spouses. Likewise, providing a capital defendant with due 
process does not permit the government to discriminate against him on the 
basis of race.55 Why, then, would it permit imposition of cruel and unusual 
punishment? 
The Fifth Amendment itself all but demonstrates that its list of 
prohibitions is neither a grant of power nor an exclusive list. It cannot 
seriously be argued that complying with one of the Fifth Amendment’s 
conditions obviates the need to comply with others—providing a grand jury 
does not justify double jeopardy, for example. Clearly, the three conditions 
are cumulative. To show that the Fifth Amendment is the exclusive list, one 
must build a wall around the Amendment and say that its rules are the only 
ones that matter to the constitutionality of capital punishment or, at the very 
least, that a holistic reading of the Bill of Rights would privilege the power 
supposedly implied by the Fifth Amendment over, for example, the 
prohibitions listed in the Eighth. It is hard to imagine how this is possible. 
One move would be to say that, as in other areas of textual 
interpretation, the specific must control the general,56 and so we must read 
the Fifth Amendment’s specific list of prohibitions as displacing the 
Eighth’s more general prohibition. This canon does not make much sense 
in the context of constitutional rights, though. It would lead to particularly 
bizarre results here, because it would suggest that the death penalty might 
be subject to constitutional abolition on Eighth Amendment grounds but for 
the fact that another provision in the Bill of Rights imposes additional 
restrictions on it. Without some evidence to the contrary, prohibitions—or 
rights, which are the same thing in this context—tend to be cumulative, 
rather than alternative. 
This is not simply a matter of logic, but of constitutional text. As Will 
Baude has pointed out, the Ninth Amendment flatly rules out the use of the 
 
condition, or something else entirely, abolitionists and anti-abolitionists generally seem to agree that it 
does not present a major obstacle to capital punishment. Of course, the federal death penalty can 
present particular problems, especially when it is sought in states that do not themselves have the death 
penalty. United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 282 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing rehearing is needed to consider situations where federal law 
orders execution of a prisoner in states that have “effectively done away with capital punishment”). 
55 Cf. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 n.19 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he 
guarantees of procedural fairness contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not resolve the 
substantive questions relating to the separate limitations imposed by the Eighth Amendment.”). 
56 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (“[I]t is a commonplace of 
statutory construction that the specific governs the general . . . .”). 
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Fifth Amendment to block consideration of the Eighth.57 The Ninth 
Amendment indicates that the entire Bill of Rights—let alone any 
particular provision of it—cannot be read as an exclusive list.58 The Ninth 
Amendment therefore confirms what the Fifth itself suggests: Compliance 
with the Fifth Amendment does not provide the death penalty a safe harbor 
against constitutional challenges, including those derived from the Eighth 
Amendment.59 
C. The Fifth Amendment Does Not Trump the Eighth 
The standard form of the Fifth Amendment Argument is anti-
abolitionist—a response to those who argue that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional, usually on Eighth Amendment grounds. But sometimes, 
as in Glossip, the target of the Argument is not only abolition, but the 
whole structure of contemporary Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
In Glossip, Justice Scalia accused Justice Breyer of “contort[ing] the 
constitutional text” by ignoring the “troubling detail” that “[h]istorically, 
the Eighth Amendment was understood to bar only those punishments that 
added ‘terror, pain, or disgrace’ to an otherwise permissible capital 
sentence.”60 But this claim about the original meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment is contestable at best,61 and, more importantly for present 
purposes, the “constitutional text” of the Fifth Amendment cannot be made 
to support it, for all the reasons discussed above. The Argument should 
therefore be unconvincing even to those who take an originalist or 
 
57 William Baude, Editorial, Is the Death Penalty Unconstitutional?, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/opinion/is-the-death-penalty-unconstitutional.html 
[https://perma.cc/64A8-V957] (arguing that Justice Scalia’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
Argument in Glossip “ignores the lesson of another constitutional amendment, the Ninth, which is 
designed to stop precisely the sort of inference that Justice Scalia is making here”). 
58 Id. (“[O]ur Ninth Amendment . . . warns that no specific right should be taken to preclude other 
possibly relevant rights.”). 
59 Because the Fifth Amendment does not mandate the persistence of capital punishment, there 
would be no intratextual absurdity if the Eighth Amendment were to forbid it. This makes it unlike, say, 
other potential absurdities in the constitutional text, such as the Vice President presiding over his own 
impeachment trial. See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own 
Impeachment Trial? A Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 849 (2000). 
60 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2747 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 96 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). 
61 See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a 
Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1742 (2008) (explaining Justice Scalia’s “originalist 
approach to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” as “intend[ing] to prohibit only certain 
inherently cruel forms of punishment, such as the rack, that were already unacceptable by the end of the 
eighteenth century”). 
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textualist approach to the Eighth Amendment,62 and largely irrelevant to 
those who do not. 
It is the Court’s own longstanding Eighth Amendment doctrine, not 
Justice Breyer’s dissent, that rejects this supposed historical understanding. 
The heart of the Fifth Amendment Argument therefore seems to be an 
attack on the “evolving standards of decency” that has animated Eighth 
Amendment doctrine for decades.63 As the Supreme Court put it in Trop v. 
Dulles, the Eighth Amendment “draw[s] its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”64 This 
does not mean that the Justices’ own “evolving” moral views determine the 
analysis,65 only that the original expected applications do not control.66 
So long as Trop is the law, the Fifth Amendment Argument against 
constitutional abolition is a nonstarter. Jurisprudentially speaking, Trop is 
Justice Scalia’s true target in Glossip, as he makes clear later in the 
opinion: 
If we were to travel down the path that Justice Breyer sets out for us and once 
again consider the constitutionality of the death penalty, I would ask that 
counsel also brief whether our cases that have abandoned the historical 
understanding of the Eighth Amendment, beginning with Trop, should be 
overruled. That case has caused more mischief to our jurisprudence, to our 
federal system, and to our society than any other that comes to mind.67 
That extraordinary series of superlatives—and its nomination of Trop 
as the single worst precedent in the Supreme Court Reports—has not 
received the attention it deserves. It is an invitation to tear up the 
foundations of existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. If and only if the 
Court does so, the Fifth Amendment Argument might become significant. 
 
62 John F. Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 531, 
541–42 (2014) (“These provisions [of the Fifth Amendment] obviously assume the existence of capital 
punishment, and one could argue, as Justice Scalia does, that they are evidence that the founding 
generation did not consider the death penalty to be ‘cruel and unusual.’ But at no point do they or any 
other part of the constitutional text ‘explicitly sanction’ the death penalty.” (footnote omitted)). 
63 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that denationalization violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); see also Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (noting that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is “progressive, and is 
not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a 
humane justice”). 
64 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
65 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (“The clearest and most reliable objective evidence 
of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”). 
66 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 266 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (reasoning that the 
Eighth Amendment is not limited to banning punishments common to the Stuart era). 
67 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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For present purposes, the question is whether the Fifth Amendment 
has any role in the underlying debate over “evolving standards of decency.” 
Two roles are possible: First, as part of the argument against Trop and in 
favor of a “historical understanding” approach to the Eighth Amendment 
(i.e., that the “evolving standards” approach is wrong), and, second, as a 
way of filling the post-Trop jurisprudential void (i.e., that the death penalty 
was constitutional on the “historical understanding”). 
As to the former, even holding aside the issue of stare decisis, there 
are well-recognized problems with strictly defining “cruel and unusual” 
punishment according to the historical understanding.68 Indeed, it was 
precisely those difficulties that once led Justice Scalia to draw limits to his 
own originalist commitments, declaring himself a “faint-hearted 
originalist” who could not imagine “upholding a statute that imposes the 
punishment of flogging.”69 
Whatever one’s position on Eighth Amendment originalism, the Fifth 
Amendment Argument does not answer these challenges, especially not the 
moral ones. The Fifth Amendment Argument is an assertion about what the 
Framers believed, not why those beliefs should matter. Accordingly, the 
Fifth Amendment Argument has very little to say about the rightness of 
Trop. In order for the Argument to matter, the Court would have to first 
reject the “evolving standards of decency” and embrace an especially strict 
originalist approach to cruel and unusual punishment that it has 
consistently rejected. 
Even if the Court were to pursue an originalist Eighth Amendment, it 
is not clear that the Fifth Amendment Argument would prove all that much 
about whether capital punishment is “cruel and unusual.” To be sure, as an 
historical matter, it is clear that the great majority of the Founders thought 
 
68 Stinneford, supra note 61, at 1765 (“Some punishments that were acceptable at the end of the 
eighteenth century seem so harsh by modern standards that it is hard to imagine any court upholding 
them.”); id. at 1742 (“In America, criminal offenders were subjected to public flogging, pillorying, or 
even mutilation. The First Congress authorized the death penalty for crimes we now consider relatively 
minor, such as counterfeiting.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 
(1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“[T]his Court has ‘not confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth 
Amendment to “barbarous” methods that were generally outlawed in the 18th century,’ but instead has 
interpreted the Amendment ‘in a flexible and dynamic manner.’” (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 171 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
69 Scalia, supra note 33, at 864. He later repudiated that position and declared himself to be an 
“honest originalist.” Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), 
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/ [https://perma.cc/4TTJ-CE7C] (“[W]hat I 
would say now is, yes, if a state enacted a law permitting flogging, it is immensely stupid, but it is not 
unconstitutional.”). In any event, the Justice apparently saw no contradiction between the Fifth 
Amendment Argument and his prior faintheartedness, since he advanced both positions in the same 
1989 article. It is beyond the scope of this short Essay to explore that issue. 
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the death penalty an appropriate means for the enforcement of some laws at 
the time. The same people who proposed and ratified the Eighth 
Amendment also proposed and ratified the Fifth, including its references to 
the death penalty.70 They also, perhaps more relevantly, proposed and 
passed capital legislation.71 
But this observation about Founding Era penological thinking cannot 
be translated directly into constitutional law, even if one is an originalist.72 
As a constitutional matter, few even among committed originalists find this 
sort of “original expectation” persuasive.73 Rather, most originalists have 
come to recognize a difference between original expected applications (i.e., 
what the Framers or ratifiers thought about whether the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited capital punishment in the late 1700s) and original meaning or 
understanding (i.e., what the Framers thought “cruel and unusual” 
punishment meant, and whether it could someday extend to capital 
punishment).74 For most originalists, it is the latter that controls.75 
The division between original expected applications and original 
meaning is particularly stark in the context of the Eighth Amendment. As 
Justice Brennan put it: 
 
70 Cf. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (“The Fifth Amendment, 
adopted at the same time as the Eighth, contemplated the continued existence of the capital 
sanction . . . .”). 
71 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 88 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The same 
Congress that proposed the Eighth Amendment also enacted the Act of April 30, 1790, which made 
several offenses punishable by death.”). 
72 In response to a similar critique leveled by Ronald Dworkin twenty years ago, Justice Scalia 
seems almost to concede this point, though he continues to invoke the Fifth Amendment Argument. 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 144–46 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997) (“Professor Dworkin is therefore close to correct in saying that the textual evidence 
I cite for the constitutionality of capital punishment (namely, the specific mention of it in several 
portions of the Bill of Rights) ought to be ‘irrelevant’ to me. To be entirely correct, he should have said 
‘superfluous.’ Surely the same point can be proved by textual evidence, even though (as far as my 
philosophy is concerned) it need not be. I adduced the textual evidence only to demonstrate that 
thoroughgoing constitutional evolutionists will be no more deterred by text than by theory.”). 
73 Id. at 144 (rejecting reliance on “concrete expectations of lawgivers”). 
74 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6 (2011) (“Constitutional interpretations are not 
limited to applications specifically intended or expected by the framers and adopters of the 
constitutional text. . . . The Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ ban 
punishments that are cruel and unusual as judged by contemporary application of these concepts and 
principles, not by how people living in 1791 would have applied them.”). 
75 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 672 (2009) (“Professor Balkin is absolutely right when he says that fidelity to 
original meaning does not require fidelity to original expected application.”); Lawrence Rosenthal, 
Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1209 (2012) (“Most originalists draw a distinction between 
the original meaning of constitutional text and its originally intended applications, arguing that only the 
former is interpretively binding.”). 
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We can thus infer that the Framers recognized the existence of what was then 
a common punishment. We cannot, however, make the further inference that 
they intended to exempt this particular punishment from the express 
prohibition of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Nor is there any 
indication in the debates on the Clause that a special exception was to be made 
for death.76 
Justice Stevens later noted that “even the four dissenters [in Furman], 
who explicitly acknowledged that the death penalty was not considered 
impermissibly cruel at the time of the Framing, proceeded to evaluate 
whether anything had changed in the intervening 181 years that 
nevertheless rendered capital punishment unconstitutional.”77 
A second problem with trying to get originalist legal mileage out of 
this bit of history is that it reads the Bill of Rights in a way that would have 
been foreign to the Framers themselves. The Fifth Amendment Argument 
infers the existence of an implicit power from the existence of an express 
prohibition. The Framers are unlikely to have drawn that conclusion.78 It is 
hard to imagine, for example, that the language of the First Amendment 
implied that Article I legitimately delegated to Congress the power to enact 
a federal religious establishment or to prevent petitions for the redress of 
grievances. Violating the original understanding of the Constitution’s logic 
is a peculiar way of honoring the document’s original meaning. 
What we are left with, then, is a fact about Founding Era views on 
capital punishment for which the language of the Fifth Amendment 
provides modest and largely unnecessary support. The only constitutional 
argument to which this fact is at all relevant is one concerning the original 
 
76 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 283 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see 
also MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 46 (1994) (“[T]hat the 
ratifiers expected a practice, like the death penalty or segregated public schooling, to persist into the 
future is evidence that they did not believe that they were prohibiting the practice. But that they did not 
believe that they were prohibiting a practice does not mean that the constitutional directive they issued 
is not best specified to prohibit the practice.”); Ely, supra note 37, at 1189–90 (“These references—
most unambiguously the reference to capital crimes—do corroborate (what we would have known 
anyway) that most members of the founding generation regarded the death penalty as a permissible 
punishment for serious offenses. To say that, however, is a far cry from saying that they meant forever 
to insulate it from invalidation under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause . . . .”). 
77 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 n.19 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 
380–84 (Burger, C.J., joined by Blackmun, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting)); see also Furman, 
408 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (“Nor are 
‘cruel and unusual punishments’ and ‘due process of law’ static concepts whose meaning and scope 
were sealed at the time of their writing.”). 
78 For a thoughtful discussion of the distinction between constitutional authorizations and 
constitutional prohibitions—the very distinction that the Fifth Amendment Argument muddles—see H. 
JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. DRONE WAR 38–
42 (2016). 
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meaning of the Eighth Amendment. And as to that, the Fifth Amendment 
itself does no work: the relevant constitutional question is whether the 
Eighth Amendment’s original meaning sets an unbreachable outer limit on 
the Eighth Amendment’s present day application. Supreme Court doctrine 
has squarely answered that question in the negative, and nothing in the 
Fifth Amendment speaks to whether the “evolving standards of decency” 
principle ought to be reconsidered. In short, the Fifth Amendment 
Argument is irrelevant to the issues at the heart of the current debate. 
CONCLUSION 
By many measures, the movement to abolish capital punishment is 
gaining steam. Wrongful convictions and botched executions continue to 
make headlines,79 and the death penalty is increasingly limited to a very 
small percentage of counties across the nation.80 In Glossip, two sitting 
Justices concluded that “the death penalty, in and of itself, now likely 
constitutes a legally prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t],’”81 and 
even defenders of the death penalty’s constitutionality seem to think that 
changes may be on the horizon.82 
Against this backdrop, the appeal of the Fifth Amendment Argument 
is apparent. If it works, then one can avoid difficult questions about the 
constitutionality of capital punishment. But it does not work. There may be 
many good reasons—including constitutional reasons—not to abolish the 
death penalty, but the Fifth Amendment is not one of them. 
  
 
79 See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, One Execution Botched, Oklahoma Delays the Next, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
29, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1iEBDCq [https://perma.cc/AU3U-S9PJ]; Jonathan M. Katz, North Carolina 
Men Are Released After Convictions Are Overturned, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1qyr7iJ 
[https://perma.cc/RCB2-4YSD]; Katie Rogers, Man Is Released After 34 Years in Prison; Murder 
Conviction is Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1LcYzrP 
[https://perma.cc/WF54-LGCL]. 
80 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2013: YEAR END REPORT, 
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/YearEnd2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JPE-VVSV] (noting that all 
eighty death sentences in 2013 came from two percent of the nation’s counties, and the thirty-nine 
executions came from just one percent); see also Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty 
and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 233–34 (2012) (finding that ten percent of counties in the 
United States accounted for all executions between 2004 and 2009 and fourteen counties accounted for 
one-third of death sentences during the same period). 
81 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII). 
82 Weiss, supra note 8. 
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